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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the district court's order requiring 
Sanpete County and the State of Utah to each pay one-half of 
1 
i 
appellees' attorneys' fees. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(g) (Supp. 
1993) gives this Court original appellate jurisdiction over 
appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought 
by persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal 
sentence. 
ISSUE PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 
Did the trial court correctly conclude, as a matter of law, 
that it could award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in a 
petition for an extraordinary writ? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
A lower court's "conclusions of law are accorded no 
deference but are reviewed for correctness." Termunde v. Cook, 
786 P.2d 1341, 1342 (Utah 1990) (citing Fernandez v. Cook, 783 
P.2d 547 (Utah 1989); see generally Stewart v. State, 830 P.2d 
306, 308 (Utah App. 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The trial court's order is included in Addendum A. The 
following provisions are included in Addendum B to this brief. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-3 (1990) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1990) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B (1991) (amended 1993) 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The petitioners are incarcerated at the Central Utah 
Correctional Facility. Appellee Nipper filed an original 
petition for a writ of mandamus in the Utah Supreme Court. 
Pursuant to Rule 20, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this 
Court referred the case to the district court. Appellees Cummins 
and Shahid filed petitions for habeas corpus directly in the 
district court. Essentially, all three claims alleged that 
constitutional rights were violated by the prison's urinalysis 
testing policies and practices. Because the petitions were 
substantially similar, the trial court consolidated the cases. 
On August 19, 1993, the cases came before the trial court 
for an evidentiary hearing. Pursuant to motion and stipulation, 
certain of the claims were dismissed as moot and the claims 
regarding William Cummins and Floyd Nipper were dismissed with 
prejudice. Appellants agreed to expunge certain disciplinary 
violations and reassess their inmate classifications. The claims 
of Yusulf Abdul Ba-ith Shahid were dismissed for mootness. 
On October 4, 1993, the trial court entered an order 
requiring that Sanpete County and the State of Utah each pay one-
half of appellees' reasonable attorneys' fees. The amount of 
attorneys' fees has not been determined. This appeal was 
originally pursued in the Utah Supreme Court; however, that Court 
poured over the matter to this Court pursuant to Rule 42, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts pertinent to this appeal are included in the 
Statement of the Case. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In Utah, attorneys' fees may be awarded only if specifically 
authorized by statute or by contract. The trial court's order in 
this case is improper because Utah's statutes do not allow for 
the award of attorneys' fees in petitions for extraordinary 
writs. 
The statutes pertaining to appointment of counsel for 
indigent defendants in criminal cases, Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1 
et seq. (1990), do not extend to the civil remedies contained in 
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Indeed, the petitions 
in this case do not even attack the convictions or sentences, but 
instead allege that the practices of the prison violate 
constitutional standards. 
Essentially, this is a claim under the remedy known in the 
common law as mandamus, which is now codified in Utah as Rule 
65B(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.1 This remedy is 
quintessentially civil in nature. Its attachment to the criminal 
justice system in this matter is purely incidental, arising 
1
 Throughout the trial court proceedings, all the parties and 
the court referred to this case as a habeas corpus matter. 
However, petitioner Nipper's case was originally brought as a 
Petition for Emergency Writ of Mandamus before the Utah Supreme 
Court. That petition specifically cited to Rule 19, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure as authority for Nipper's claims. 
4 
solely due to the petitioners' incarceration. This incidental 
relationship does not make mandamus a part of the criminal 
prosecution. Therefore, Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1 does not 
require either the appointment or payment of counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
STATUTORY LAW DOES NOT ALLOW AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' 
PEES IN PETITIONS FOR EXTRAORDINARY WRIT; THEREFORE, 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER WAS INCORRECT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
A. Attorneys' fees can be awarded only when 
specifically authorized by statute. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated: "In Utah, attorney fees 
are awardable only if authorized by statute or by contract." 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988); see 
also Tholen v. Sandy City, 849 P.2d 592, 596 (Utah App. 1993). 
As this Court stated in Tholen, the legislature has specifically 
allowed for the payment of attorneys' fees in certain situations. 2 
Tholen, 849 P.2d at 596. When a statute allows attorneys' fees, 
such an award may be appropriate. However, in the face of 
legislative silence, such an award is never appropriate. 
Nevertheless, the trial court awarded attorneys' fees. Prior 
precedent requires a court to deny attorneys' fees unless 
specifically allowed by statute. 
2
 See Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1 (Supp. 1993) (liability for 
writing of bad check); Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-17 (1988) (mechanics' 
liens); Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1992) (actions brought in bad 
faith). The trial court did not rely on any of those statutes for 
its decision, nor are any of them relevant. 
5 
In fact, the trial court did not even purport to create a 
legal justification for its order. The court's justification was 
grounded not in law, but in its view of the best policy choice. 
In examining the transcripts of the two court hearings held on 
this matter, it appears that the court's order arose from a 
concern about the hardship that a pro bono work would impose on 
the attorneys in Sanpete who are, in the court's view, eligible 
to represent inmates in these matters.3 From that conclusion, 
which was not based on evidentiary facts, the trial court decided 
that the state was obligated to pay attorneys' fees. (Tr. of 
Hearing before Judge Don V. Tibbs, February 19, 1992, at 15). 
Even assuming that the trial court accurately expressed the 
policy concerns, it is inappropriate for the trial court to 
disregard the law in order to implement its policy choice. Under 
our constitution, the legislature, not the judiciary, makes 
policy decisions. Thus, the trial court's concerns are best left 
for legislative determination. See Parsons v. Barnes, No. 
920126, slip.op. at 21 (Utah, filed January 11, 1994). This is a 
case in which the trial court ignored the law, as interpreted 
both by this Court and the Utah Supreme Court, to reach the 
desired result. 
3
 The trial court was of the view that it could only appoint 
two attorneys, specifically Andrew Berry or Paul Frishknecht, 
because they were the only attorneys who resided in the area and 
did not represent the government in some capacity. The court also 
believed that it lacked the authority to appoint an attorney who 
lived outside of Sanpete or Sevier County. (Tr. of Hearing before 
Judge Don V. Tibbs, February 19, 1993, at 11-14). 
6 
B. Utah Code Ann, § 77-32-1 did not give the 
court statutory authorization to pay 
attorneys' fees in this action because it is 
not part of the criminal prosecution. 
In argument before the trial court, the petitioners stated 
that the payment of attorneys' fees was required by Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-32-1 (1990). That argument is incorrect. Section 77-
32-1 requires appointment of attorneys for indigent persons in 
criminal prosecutions. As respondent's trial counsel pointed 
out, however, this petition for extraordinary writ is not a 
criminal prosecution. (Tr. of Hearing before Judge Don V. Tibbs, 
February 19, 1993, at 6). In Beal v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 418, 454 
P.2d 624, 627 (Utah 1969), the Utah Supreme Court interpreted 
section 77-32-1 to include only "matters affecting guilt or 
innocence and the fairness of the trials by which those ends are 
accomplished." Included in these matters were "writs of habeas 
corpus." Today, the habeas corpus action referred to in Beal is 
found in Rule 65B(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.4 
Although the trial court referred to this action as a writ 
of habeas corpus, it was, in fact, originally filed in the Utah 
Supreme Court as a petition for a writ of mandamus. The action 
brought by petitioners does not affect either guilt or innocence 
4
 Due to the numerous amendments to Rule 65B, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, since 1969, the fundamental distinctions between 
the common law writs have been ignored. It is altogether too 
common for practitioners and pro se litigants, as well as courts, 
to identify mandamus actions as habeas corpus actions, and vice 
versa. Unfortunately, this mislabeling invariably results in the 
use of incorrect legal authority and confused case law. With 
Preece v. House, 848 P.2d 163 (Utah App. 1993), however, this Court 
has begun to clarify this complicated area of the law. 
7 
or the fairness of their trials.5 It challenges, instead, the 
prison's policy for urinalysis testing of inmates and states that 
the prison failed to comply with that policy. 
Even though this issue is not even related to the 
petitioner's guilt or innocence or the fairness of his trial, 
petitioners nonetheless claim that this case is a criminal 
prosecution because their incarceration results from the criminal 
prosecution.6 Under that reasoning, every action brought by an 
inmate against the prison would then become criminal in nature --
torts, civil rights actions, malpractice lawsuits, etc. -- and 
would, therefore, require appointment, and payment, of counsel. 
The trial court had no legal authority upon which to justify 
its order. The trial court made a decision to award attorneys' 
fees even in the absence of legal support and in the face of 
prior, contrary court precedent. The trial court appeared to 
understand that its order was legally improper but it continued 
on its course nevertheless, with the sole aim of forcing an 
5
 In essence, petitioners claim that the prison failed to 
comply with the law. As stated in Rule 65B(e), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure (the modern codification of mandamus) this is a 
fundamental element in a mandamus claim. 
6
 "They're [sic] incarcerated because they violated the law 
and were found to be guilty, but have been sentenced by the Court 
to serve in this facility. Violation of their rights and of their 
constitutional rights necessarily flow from the conviction itself 
and from the sentencing procedure itself." (Tr. of Hearing before 
Judge Don V. Tibbs, March 31, 1993 at 41, Statement of Andrew 
Berry, attorney for petitioners). 
8 
appeal and requiring this Court to issue a decision.7 As this 
Court stated less than one year ago in Tholen, attorneys' fees 
may be awarded only when authorized by statute. Because no 
statute authorizes attorneys' fees in writ proceedings, the trial 
court's order was incorrect and must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, respondents request that this 
Court reverse the trial court's order mandating Sanpete County 
and the State of Utah to pay petitioners' attorneys' fees. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS A A day of January 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
LitJi A a Jit 
Tfmes H. Beadle J^ Lm s 
Assistant Attorney General 
7 ffI don't want this to go up to them and then have them [the 
appellate courts] doge [sic] it. And I'm putting this on the 
record. I don't want them dodging it. I want them to meet it full 
on. I want them to give me some direction and give the other 
District Judges in this area some direction on what we are to do . 
. . ." (Tr. of Hearing before Judge Don V. Tibbs, February 19, 
1993 at 18, statement by the court). 
9 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
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UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 
Respondent. 
Casf Nd inn in 




FRED VAN DER VEUR, Warden C.U.C.F.#: 
Respondent. : 
Case No. 92060033 
On the 19th day of February, 1992, the court's order to show 
cause why the State of Utah and Sanpete County should not be 
required to pay the attorney fees incurred by counsel appointed 
by the court to represent the petitioners in the above-referenced 
cases, (which have been consolidated for trial), came on for 
hearing before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs. David M. Carlson, 
Assistant Attorney General, appeared on behalf of the State of 
Utah, Ross C. Blackham, Sanpete County Attorney, appeared on 
behalf of Sanpete County. Paul R. Frischnecht and Andrew B. 
Berry appeared and were appointed by the court as counsel for the 
petitioners herein. 
After hearing argument from counsel, certain stipulations of 
fact were entered into at the request of the court; these 
arguments and stipulations are contained in the transcript of the 
hearing, an accurate and complete copy of which is attached 
hereto as "Exhibit 1" and incorporated herein by this reference. 
2 
The court then ruled that; the State of Utah and Sanpete ------
£ 1 t in 111 I i I | I HI III 11 l 1 II it i | II 11 il I II I I HI i n ) II f l ' , ' 1 I II II i U 
appoin ted t o lep i i .ii'»nt the p e t i t i o n e r s he r e in 
T h e r e a f t e r , on March 31 I "imp | he cour t heF-ird arqumer:*- " n 
t i l l '• I i l l II I I I ill I 11 11 1 ' d l l l l p H f I, MM III ill j II II II I I ,11 III II i L t l U l l L l i J l ^ 
February I (+ 1992 r u l i n g on the payment of a t t o r n e y fees 
M Car lson , ftc,qistant At torney Generri I iii| ipeared on b e h a i i ui trie 
S t d I f i I III il 111 II' o L I, II" I d L kiiaiii, Sanpe t e L c un L y At1orney, 
appeared on behalf of Sanpete County, and Paul P I i ischnecht and 
Andrew B Hf r ry aj ipeared on behalf of the pet i t ion!- i I M n i . 
A£t<Li l iear ing argument Irom counsel and a l t e r e n t e r i n g i n t o 
i i i l a HI s t i p u l a t i o n s of fun l il In rom I denied the motion t o 
r e c o n s i d e m i p f t f f i i n i i rn*| ill « IMIIIII M I | II I i ill II In ' I nil II I I'll i l l in I 
1
 I I I | I I I  L I, MiiJiill , Willi h i be. l e q u n e d Lu pa\ 1 In" d l lLo i i i ey l e e s o f 
nisei appointed to represent the petitioners herein, The basis 
w l I I M i . M I I . (i i it I i ii< | i r. rt r. n f - i I ' I l i I I L * I L h ' 1 " | " " ' V M P t 
I i i l.h i n Lhe Li dribt:i ipL ui Liie Mm Hi Ml 1992 heiii iiiinni iini 
u r a t e and c o m p l e t e copy of which i s a t t a c h e d I in in l u a s 
" E x l u l i i l ' in mi in i II mi mi in i I 'H 'pnt a l enl l i e i P in mi lip, 1 II i i i- i p t e I e n o e . 
WHEREFORE, II IS HEREBY ORDERED that Lhe State of Utah and 
Sanpete County shall each pay one half of the reasonable attorney 
3 
fees incurred by counsel appointed herein in their representation 
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and foregoing ORDER postage prepaid in the United States Mail, 
addressed to the following; 
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I hereby certify that on the grH~\ day of September, 1993, I 
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50 North Main Street 
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ADDENDUM B 
77-32-1. Minimum standards provided by county for defense of indigent defendants. 
The following are minimum standards to be provided by each county, city and town for the 
defense of indigent persons in criminal cases in the courts and various administrative bodies of 
the state: 
(1) Provide counsel for every indigent person who faces the substantial probability of the 
deprivation of his liberty; 
(2) Afford timely representation by competent legal counsel; 
(3) Provide the investigatory and other facilities necessary for a complete defense; 
(4) Assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client; and 
(5) Include the taking of a first appeal of right and the prosecuting of other remedies before 
or after a conviction, considered by the defending counsel to be in the interest of justice except 
for other and subsequent discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings. 
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company 
77-^? 1 M i n i m u m sLtiitiaiflK provided |M Minh, lnr ili:it:iisi. null IIKIIJ.H'IH defendant!-
•ie roiiovv :.L *e minn u*:i s tandards to be provided by each county , city and town for the 
defense of indigent persons - cr iminal cases in the courts and various adminis t ra t ive bodies of 
the state-
; r'i z counsel for i; Me 
depr ivat ion » 
) K*pr *n by con.-. coun>d ; 
{5) Provide tne investigatory and other t \ for a comple te defense; 
(4) Assure undivided loyalty of defend cuumci iu uie client; and 
(5) Include the taking of a first appeal of right and the prosecuting of other remedies before 
or after a conviction, considered by the defending counsel to be in the interest of justice except 
for other and subsequent discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings. 
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company 
77-32-3. Duties of assigned counsel - Compensation. 
(1) When representing an indigent person the assigned counsel shall: 
(a) Counsel and defend him at every stage of the proceeding following assignment; and 
(b) Prosecute any first appeal of right or other remedies before or after conviction that he 
considers to be in the interest of justice except for other and subsequent discretionary appeals 
or discretionary writ proceedings. 
(2) An assigned counsel shall not have the duty or power under this section to represent an 
indigent defendant in any discretionary appeal or action for a discretionary writ, other than in 
a meaningful first appeal of right to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to 
present his claims fairly in the context of the appellate process of this state. 
(3) An assigned counsel for an indigent defendant shall be entitled to compensation upon the 
approval of the district court where the original trial was held, upon a showing that the 
defendant has been denied a constitutional right or that there was newly discovered evidence that 
would show the defendant's innocence and that the legal services rendered by counsel were other 
than that required under this act or under a separate fee arrangement and were necessary for the 
indigent defendant and not for the purpose of delaying the judgment of the original trier of fact. 
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company 
Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief. 
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available, 
a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief on any of the grounds set forth in 
paragraph (b) (involving wrongful imprisonment), paragraph (c) (involving other types of 
wrongful restraint on personal liberty), paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of public or 
corporate authority) or paragraph (e) (involving the wrongful use of judicial authority and the 
failure to exercise such authority). There shall be no special form of writ. The procedures in this 
rule shall govern proceedings on all petitions for extraordinary relief. To the extent that this rule 
does not provide special procedures, proceedings on petitions for extraordinary relief shall be 
governed by the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules. 
(b) Wrongful imprisonment. 
(1) Scope. Any person committed by a court to imprisonment in a state prison, other 
correctional facility or county jail who asserts that the commitment resulted from a substantial 
denial of rights may petition the court for relief under this paragraph. This paragraph (b) shall 
govern proceedings based on claims relating to original commitments and commitments for 
violation of probation or parole. This paragraph (b) shall not govern proceedings based on claims 
relating to the terms or conditions of confinement. 
(2) Commencement. Except for challenges to parole violation proceedings, the proceeding 
shall be commenced by filing a petition, together with a copy thereof, with the clerk of the 
district court in the county in which the commitment leading to confinement was issued. The 
court may order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or 
witnesses. Petitions challenging parole violation proceedings shall be commenced by filing a 
petition together with a copy thereof, with the clerk of the district court in the county in which 
the petitioner is located. 
(3) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in 
relation to the legality of the commitment. Additional claims relating to the legality of the 
commitment may not be raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The 
petition shall state: 
(A) the place where the petitioner is restrained; 
(B) the name of the court by which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and the 
dates of proceedings in which the conviction was entered, together with the court's case number 
for those proceedings, if known by the petitioner; 
(C) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts on the basis of which the petitioner claims 
a substantial violation of rights as the result of the commitment; 
(D) whether or not the judgment of conviction or the commitment for violation of 
probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and caption or title of 
the appellate proceeding and the results of the review; 
(E) whether the legality of the commitment has already been adjudicated in any prior 
post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and if so the reasons for the denial of relief in the 
prior proceeding. 
(4) Attachments to the petition. The petitioner shall attach to the petition affidavits, copies 
of records or other evidence available to the petitioner in support of the allegations. The 
petitioner shall also attach to the petition a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any 
prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the commitment, 
and a copy of all orders and memoranda of the court. If copies of pertinent pleadings, orders, 
and memoranda are not attached, the petition shall state why they are not attached. 
(5) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or 
discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two 
copies of which shall be filed with the petition. 
(6) Assignment by the presiding judge. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly 
deliver it to the assigned judge of the court in which it is filed. Except for challenges to parole 
violation proceedings, the presiding judge shall if possible assign the proceeding to the judge 
who issued the commitment. 
(7) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is apparent to the court 
that the issues presented in the petition have already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or 
if for any other reason any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall 
forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on its face. The 
order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the 
entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or 
conclusions of law. 
(8) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part 
of the petition is not frivolous on its face, the court shall designate the portions of the petition 
that are not frivolous and direct the clerk to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any 
memorandum by mail upon the attorney general and the county attorney. 
(9) Responsive pleading. Within twenty days (plus time allowed under these rules for 
service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the attorney general and county 
attorney, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the attorney general or 
county attorney shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition that have not 
been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response upon the petitioner in accordance 
with Rule 5(b). Within twenty days (plus time allowed for service by mail) after service of any 
motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the 
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motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the court. 
(10) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the proceeding for 
a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. Upon motion for good cause, the court may grant 
leave to either party to take discovery or to extend the date for the hearing. Prior to the hearing, 
the court may order either the petitioner or the state or county to obtain any relevant transcript 
or court records. The court may also order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not 
be set so as to delay unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. The petitioner shall 
be present before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present 
in court during the proceeding. 
(11) Orders. If the court rules in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter an appropriate order 
with respect to the validity of the challenged commitment and with respect to rearraignment, 
retrial, resentencing, custody, bail or discharge. The court shall enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, as appropriate, following any evidentiary hearing or any hearing on a 
dispositive motion. Upon application of the attorney general or the county attorney, or upon its 
own motion, the court may stay release of the petitioner pending appeal of its order. 
(12) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d), 
to any party as it deems appropriate. If the petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the 
proceeding, the petitioner may proceed upon an affidavit of impecuniosity, in which event the 
court may direct that the costs be paid by the county in which the complainant was originally 
charged. 
(13) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be appealed to and 
reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the statutes 
governing appeals to those courts. 
(c) Other wrongful restraints on personal liberty. 
(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by paragraph (b) of this rule, this paragraph (c) 
shall govern all petitions claiming that a person has been wrongfully restrained of personal 
liberty, and the court may grant relief appropriate under this paragraph. 
(2) Commencement. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk 
of the court in the district in which the petitioner is restrained or the respondent resides or in 
which the alleged restraint is occurring. 
(3) Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition shall contain a short, plain 
statement of the facts on the basis of which the petitioner seeks relief. It shall identify the 
respondent and the place where the person is restrained. It shall state the cause or pretense of 
the restraint, if known by the petitioner. It shall state whether the legality of the restraint has 
already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so, the reasons for the denial of relief in 
the prior proceeding. The petitioner shall attach to the petition any legal process available to the 
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petitioner that resulted in restraint. The petitioner shall also attach to the petition a copy of the 
pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the 
restraint. 
(4) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or 
discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two 
copies of which shall be filed with the petition. 
(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is apparent to the court 
that the legality of the restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any 
other reason any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith 
issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on its face and the reasons 
for this conclusion. The order need not state findings of fact or conclusions of law. The order 
shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry 
of the order of dismissal. 
(6) Responsive pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed as being frivolous on its face, the 
court shall direct the clerk of the court to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any 
memorandum upon the respondent by mail. At the same time, the court may issue an order 
directing the respondent to answer or otherwise respond to the petition, specifying a time within 
which the respondent must comply. If the circumstances require, the court may also issue an 
order directing the respondent to appear before the court for a hearing on the legality of the 
restraint. An answer to a petition shall state plainly whether the respondent has restrained the 
person alleged to have been restrained, whether the person so restrained has been transferred to 
any other person, and if so, the identity of the transferee, the date of the transfer, and the reason 
or authority for the transfer. Nothing in paragraph (c) shall be construed to prohibit the court 
from ruling upon the petition based upon a dispositive motion. 
(7) Temporary relief. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained will be removed 
from the court's jurisdiction or will suffer irreparable injury before compliance with the hearing 
order can be enforced, the court shall issue a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the 
respondent before the court to be dealt with according to law. Pending a determination of the 
petition, the court may place the person alleged to have been restrained in the custody of such 
other persons as may be appropriate. 
(8) Alternative service of the hearing order. If the respondent cannot be found, or if it 
appears that a person other than the respondent has custody of the person alleged to be 
restrained, the hearing order and any other process issued by the court may be served on the 
person having custody in the manner and with the same effect as if that person had been named 
as respondent in the action. 
(9) Avoidance of service by respondent. If anyone having custody of the person alleged to 
be restrained avoids service of the hearing order or attempts wrongfully to remove the person 
from the court's jurisdiction, the sheriff shall immediately arrest the responsible person. The 
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sheriff shall forthwith bring the person arrested before the court to be dealt with according to 
law. 
(10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event that the court orders a hearing, the court 
shall hear the matter in a summary fashion and shall render judgment accordingly. The 
respondent or other person having custody shall appear with the person alleged to be restrained 
or shall state the reasons for failing to do so. The court may nevertheless direct the respondent 
to bring before it the person alleged to be restrained. If the petitioner waives the right to be 
present at the hearing, the court shall modify the hearing order accordingly. The hearing order 
shall not be disobeyed for any defect of form or any misdescription in the order or the petition, 
if enough is stated to impart the meaning and intent of the proceeding to the respondent. 
(d) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority. 
(1) Who may petition the court; security. The attorney general may, and when directed to 
do so by the governor shall, petition the court for relief on the grounds enumerated in this 
paragraph (d). Any person who is not required to be represented by the attorney general and 
who is aggrieved or threatened by one of the acts enumerated in subparagraph (2) of this 
paragraph (d) may petition the court under this paragraph (d) if (A) the person claims to be 
entitled to an office unlawfully held by another or (B) if the attorney general fails to file a 
petition under this paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petition filed by a 
person other than the attorney general under this paragraph shall be brought in the name of the 
petitioner, and the petition shall be accompanied by an undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay 
any judgment for costs and damages that may be recovered against the petitioner in the 
proceeding. The sureties shall be in the form for bonds on appeal provided for in Rule 73. 
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where a person usurps, 
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, whether civil or military, a 
franchise, or an office in a corporation created by the authority of the state of Utah; (B) where 
a public officer does or permits any act that results in a forfeiture of the office; (C) where 
persons act as a corporation in the state of Utah without being legally incorporated; (D) where 
any corporation has violated the laws of the state of Utah relating to the creation, alteration or 
renewal of corporations; or (E) where any corporation has forfeited or misused its corporate 
rights, privileges or franchises. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may require that notice 
be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order 
requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may also grant 
temporary relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A. 
(e) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty. 
(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are threatened by any of the 
acts enumerated in this paragraph (e) may petition the court for relief. 
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(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an inferior court, 
administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or 
abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person 
has failed to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; or (C) where 
an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has refused the petitioner the use 
or enjoyment of a right or office to which the petitioner is entitled. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may require that 
notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order 
requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may direct the 
inferior court, administrative agency, officer, corporation or other person named as respondent 
to deliver to the court a transcript or other record of the proceedings. The court may also grant 
temporary relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A. 
(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in nature, the 
court's review shall not extend further than to determine whether the respondent has regularly 
pursued its authority. 
6 
